INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 2000, Ryan K. Schorr, a twenty-five-year-old who suffered from bipolar disorder, was involuntarily committed to the Holy Spirit Hospital in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, after his family and roommate noticed that his condition was deteriorating.
1 Though Schorr was placed in a high security room at the hospital, when a crisis intervention worker opened his door to enter, he pushed past her and escaped confinement.
2 After Schorr answered his family's phone call to his apartment, his family informed the police of his whereabouts.
The circumstances of Schorr's death are, unfortunately, not unique. There are a number of cases in which police officers, in attempts to apprehend people with mental disabilities, have injured or killed them, even when the victim's family or friend originally summoned the officers to provide assistance. 10 However, what distinguishes the Schorrs' case from the majority of excessive force cases is that the Schorrs not only brought the usual claims for police misconduct under Section 1983, 11 but also sued the police commission under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 12 and the Rehabilitation Act. 13 The Schorrs alleged that the police commission violated their 5 Schorr II, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. 157, 195 (2005) ("A lack of community-based treatment alternatives and law enforcement's inability to appropriately respond to persons with a mental illness through appropriate policies and programs result in the unjustified institutionalization of persons with a mental illness in jails and prisons, and too often result in their deaths.").
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) . 12 42 U.S.C. § § 12101-12213 (2000). 13 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) . Claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act pertaining to police officers' actions in effecting an arrest are similar in substance and are often treated by courts as interchangeable. Therefore, references to the ADA son's right to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability by "failing to make reasonable modifications to [its] policies, practices and procedure to ensure that his needs as an individual with a disability would be met," 14 in violation of Title II of the ADA. 15 The court agreed that the Schorrs could state a claim under Title II, 16 as well as under Section 1983. 17 While the court's decision in Schorr I was a significant step toward acceptance of the ADA's application to law enforcement activities, 18 it was not the first judicial opinion to espouse such a notion. As early as 1998, courts began laying the foundation for claims of police misconduct under Title II. 19 The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the applicability of Title II to police actions in effecting an arrest, 20 and historically the circuit courts have been split on the question. 21 However, in many jurisdictions plaintiffs can now bring ADA throughout this Comment should be read to include Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two actions.
14 Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 Title II provides: "Subject to the provisions of this [title] , no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) . 16 See Schorr I, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (" [I] t is clear to this Court that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the ADA."). 17 See id. at 234 (characterizing plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim as a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim and denying defendants' motion to dismiss on that count). 18 See McConnell, supra note 1 (noting that Judge Kane, who presided over the Schorrs' case, was "one of the first judges to recognize that how police respond to people with disabilities depends on their training"). 19 See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) (broadly construing Title II's phrase "programs, services, or activities" and holding that prisoners could fall within the category of "qualified individual[s] with a disability"); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 913 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a disabled arrestee's claim against police officers fell within the ADA). 20 For the purposes of this Comment, I will use the term "arrest" broadly to refer to any action by a police officer detaining or incarcerating an individual. Accord Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1220 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) ("This opinion broadly uses the term 'arrest' to include several different scenarios: arrests [,] investigations potentially involving an arrest, . . . and violent confrontations not technically involving an arrest . . . ."). 21 See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that while Title II does not apply to police officers' "on-the-street" responses to disturbances, once an area is secure and there is no threat to human safety, the officers must reasonably accommodate a suspect's disability); Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1221 ("[A] broad rule categorically excluding arrests from the scope of Title II . . . is not the law."); Gorman,
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 154: 157 claims pertaining to police misconduct and realistically believe that they have a chance for recovery. 22 The growing possibility that disabled plaintiffs 23 can bring claims for police misconduct under Title II has significant benefits for the practice of civil rights law in this country. The traditional route for police misconduct lawsuits, Section 1983, presents many obstacles to success for both disabled plaintiffs 24 and the general population. 25 Any alternative means of bringing a subset of civil rights cases-even one that is limited to a specific group of plaintiffs (disabled persons) and a specific type of claim (police misconduct)-should not be ignored. This Comment will explore courts' treatment of actions for police misconduct under Title II and the contours of the decisional law in that area. Part I will discuss the theoretical bases for application of the ADA to arrests, namely the wrongful arrest theory and the reasonable accommodation theory. Part II will analyze the case law that has arisen out of plaintiffs' attempts to bring claims for police misconduct under Title II. Part II will also demonstrate how initial assumptions that lower courts made about the applicability of the ADA to such lawsuits-which prevented them from allowing the claims to go for-152 F.3d at 912 (holding that plaintiff's claims pertaining to police officers' actions in transporting him to the police station after an arrest fit within the meaning of the ADA); Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The most obvious problem is fitting an arrest into the ADA at all."); see also McConnell, supra note 1 (noting that historically the circuit courts have been split on whether the ADA applies to police activities). See generally Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2002) (surveying cases pertaining to ADA application to police activities). 22 See infra Part II.C (discussing recent cases ruling on claims of police misconduct under the ADA). 23 This Comment will focus mainly on actions by individuals with mental or emotional disabilities because they are frequently subject to interaction with the police. See Avery, supra note 10, at 262-63 ("[I]n medium and large cities nationwide, police departments estimate that an average of approximately seven percent of police calls involve mentally ill people."). However, in analyzing the decisional law surrounding the ADA, I will also discuss cases involving plaintiffs who suffer from a variety of other disabilities, including deafness, paraplegia, and physical difficulties resulting from a stroke. The type of disability in an individual case is often relevant to the question of whether the police officers were aware of the plaintiff's disability because individuals with mental and emotional disabilities may be less likely to inform the officers of their disability, and the disability itself may not be immediately apparent to the officer. See infra note 173 for a discussion of the knowledge requirement under Title II.
24 See Avery, supra note 10, at 265-66 (discussing mentally disabled plaintiffs' difficulties in proving claims against police officers under Section 1983).
25 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 538 (2003) (noting that the Rehnquist Court ruled against plaintiffs in the "overwhelming majority" of civil rights cases).
ward-were discredited by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 26 leaving the path clear for acceptance of Title II in the law enforcement context. Part III addresses the question of why a disabled plaintiff should bring ADA claims for civil rights violations when the traditional remedy is an action under Section 1983. Part III will also compare the obstacles to recovery under each claim and will attempt to determine under what circumstances an ADA claim might succeed even when a parallel Section 1983 action would likely fail. In addition, Part III will describe the distinction between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and the advantages and disadvantages of pleading a parallel claim under the Rehabilitation Act in addition to an ADA claim. Finally, Part III will provide reasons, beyond strategic benefits, for disabled plaintiffs to plead claims in addition to the usual Section 1983 claims. In conclusion, this Comment will bring together two strands of argument-the feasibility of ADA claims for police misconduct and the desirability of those actions over the traditional civil rights claims-to demonstrate that there are important practical and symbolic reasons for plaintiffs to plead their disability claims under the ADA. THE ADA TO ARRESTS:  WRONGFUL ARREST THEORY AND REASONABLE  ACCOMMODATION THEORY Courts have developed two different theories under which a plaintiff may state an ADA claim based on police officers' actions in effecting an arrest. 27 The "wrongful arrest theory" applies when police officers have "wrongly arrested someone with a disability because they misperceived the effects of that disability as criminal activity." 28 A claim under the "reasonable accommodation theory," on the other 26 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 27 Although courts have analyzed ADA claims according to these theories for over ten years, it appears that no court had articulated the terms "wrongful arrest theory" and "reasonable accommodation theory" in reference to the analysis of an ADA claim pertaining to police officer action until hand, posits that even though police officers properly investigated and arrested a person with a disability, they "failed to reasonably accommodate the person's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees."
I. THEORETICAL BASES FOR APPLYING

29
In addition, there are cases that fall in between the two theories, to which courts have generally declined to apply Title II.
30
A. Wrongful Arrest Theory
A plaintiff has a valid claim under the wrongful arrest theory if police officers have arrested her because of lawful actions that she has taken as result of her disability. The paradigm case illustrating this theory is Lewis v. Truitt. 31 In Lewis, three police officers went to plaintiff Charles Lewis's home in order to take his granddaughter to police headquarters to resolve a custody dispute. 32 The officers attempted to speak with Lewis, even though other people present at the house had told the officers that Lewis was deaf and that the best way to communicate with him was by writing questions down on a piece of paper. 33 The officers proceeded to enter the plaintiff's home and "physically assault[]" him, causing "bruises, contusions, and severe internal injuries."
34 They eventually arrested him and charged him with resisting law enforcement. 35 Lewis filed an action against the officers and the city under the ADA, and the court partially denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claim, stating that "a genuine issue of material fact exists on the question of whether Defendants arrested he was arrested because of symptoms that he suffered after a stroke and that the Town of Sanford had failed to train its police officers to recognize such symptoms and to modify its policies, practices, and procedures to prevent discriminatory treatment of the disabled.
37
Jackson had been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs after a police officer noticed that he was "unsteady on his feet, swayed noticeably, slurred his speech, and appeared confused." 38 Even though Jackson informed the officer that he was not drunk and that he had suffered a brain aneurysm that left him with physical difficulties, the officer insisted that Jackson perform sobriety tests.
39
After Jackson could not satisfactorily complete the tests due to his physical disabilities, the officer arrested him. 40 The court denied the town's motion for summary judgment on the ADA claims.
41
Although few judges have specifically recognized the existence of the wrongful arrest theory in their rulings on plaintiffs' ADA claims for police misconduct, the idea behind the wrongful arrest theorythat police officers violate the ADA when they arrest a disabled individual because of actions that the individual was engaged in due to her disability-has been espoused by courts in a number of circuits. While the wrongful arrest theory applies when an arrest results from an individual's disability, the reasonable accommodation theory applies when there is a legitimate basis for the arrest, but in making that arrest the police officers do not take steps to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability. Even though a number of courts have noted their preference for the wrongful arrest theory over the reasonable accommodation theory, with some even stating that only claims under the former are viable, 43 recent developments in Title II jurisprudence 44 have opened the door to plaintiffs' arguments under the reasonable accommodation theory.
In Rosen v. Montgomery County, plaintiff Jeffrey Rosen presented a Title II claim under the reasonable accommodation theory, contending that police officers made no attempt to accommodate his deafness when they took him into custody after his arrest for drunk driving. 45 According to Rosen, the officers did not attempt to communicate with him in writing and they "ignored his requests for an interpreter and for a TTY telephone so he could call a lawyer." 46 The court rejected Rosen's ADA claims and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants based on a "lack of any discernible injury" that Rosen may have suffered. 47 Even though its decision rested on the lack of injury, the court made clear its reservations about applying the ADA in such a situation. Declaring that the "most obvious problem" with the plaintiff's claim was "fitting an arrest into the ADA at all," 48 the court went on to limit the duties that police officers owe to suspects before arriving at the stationhouse: " do not have to get an interpreter before they can stop and shackle a fleeing bank robber, and they do not have to do so to stop a suspected drunk driver, conduct a field sobriety test, and make an arrest."
49
Four years later, however, in McCray v. City of Dothan, a district court in Alabama allowed a deaf plaintiff's ADA claim to go forward under the reasonable accommodation theory, based on the officers' failure to provide an interpreter during the interrogation and after the arrest. 50 The officers had been attempting to interrogate the plaintiff about a private property traffic accident. When one of the officers refused to communicate by handwritten notes with the plaintiff, the incident escalated into a confrontation and the officers allegedly assaulted the plaintiff and arrested him. 51 The court held that under the circumstances, the police were "under an obligation under the ADA to accommodate in effecting arrest activities," 52 and that the appropriateness of the officers' attempts at reasonable accommodation were disputed issues of material fact.
53
Like the wrongful arrest theory, the reasonable accommodation theory has often guided the determinations of courts in principle even when the courts did not cite the theory by name. 54 Even though it appears that these claims are less successful than claims under the wrongful arrest theory because of some courts' reluctance to find such actions cognizable under the ADA, 55 Because the wrongful arrest theory and the reasonable accommodation theory each apply only to a subset of possible Title II claims pertaining to police officers' actions in effecting the arrest of a disabled individual, it is not surprising that there are cases that do not fit neatly into either of the theories. In Gohier v. Enright, a police officer was responding to reported disturbances when he saw the plaintiff's decedent, Michael Lucero, walking down the street. 57 Lucero did not match the description of the man for whom the officer was looking. 58 The police officer nevertheless got out of his car and approached Lucero, who suffered from schizophrenia, and a confrontation ensued, prompting the officer to draw his pistol.
59
Lucero did not respond to the officer's order to show his hands and instead, while holding a "long, slender object that [the officer] thought was a knife," advanced on the officer. 60 When Lucero reached the officer's car he "either stepped or lunged toward [the officer], making a stabbing motion with the object." 61 The officer shot him twice, killing him. 62 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and held that the circumstances leading to Lucero's death created an ADA claim that was "logically intermediate between the two archetypes envisioned" by the wrongful arrest theory and the reasonable accommodation theory. 63 The officer was not using force on Lucero because the officer "misconceived the lawful effects of [Lucero's] disability as criminal activity"; also, the officer did not "fail to accommodate Lucero's disability while arresting him for 'some crime unrelated to his disability.'" 64 Rather, the court reasoned, the officer used force because Lucero's conduct was not lawful.
clusion that the reasonable accommodation theory did not apply to the plaintiffs' action). 57 to go forward based on the shooting death of plaintiffs' decedent that occurred as police officers were trying to apprehend him after he escaped from a high security room at a hospital). It is also important to note that the Courts' receptiveness to plaintiffs' actions for police misconduct under Title II generally appears to be limited to claims under either the wrongful arrest theory or the reasonable accommodation theory. While judges have allowed a fair number of such claims to go forward, 65 Gohier suggests that plaintiffs who are arrested for engaging in illegal activity (such as assaulting a police officer) related to their disability may fall into a gap between the two theories. As a result, these plaintiffs may be unable to state an ADA claim even if the officers did not reasonably accommodate the disability in effecting the arrest. o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity . . . ." (emphasis added)).
70 See Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 656 (holding that criminal suspects who are being held against their will do not count as applicants who are seeking a benefit from the the framers of the ADA did not intend for Title II to apply to arrestees and prisoners. 71 Courts generally did not question these assumptions for the first eight years that the ADA was in effect. 72 However, in the late 1990s, encouraged by the Supreme Court's opinion in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 73 courts began to challenge, and eventually discard, all three of these assumptions.
A. Who Is a "Qualified Individual with a Disability"?:
Old Assumptions About Title II
The decision of the district court in Gorman v. Bartch illustrates the early limitations imposed on Title II application to police activities. Plaintiff Jeffrey Gorman was arrested outside a bar in Kansas City while he attempted to obtain assistance from two police officers after he had been asked to leave the bar. 74 Gorman suffered from paraplegia resulting from a severe spinal cord injury and was confined to a wheelchair. 75 However, the police van that the officers used to transport Gorman to the station lacked the equipment necessary for carrying a person in a wheelchair. 76 As a result, the officers took Gorman out of his wheelchair, lifted him onto a bench within the van, and used his belt to tie him to the wall behind the bench. 
").
71 See Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 655 ("The term 'qualified individual' was specifically defined by Congress to describe a person who meets eligibility requirements for the . . . participation in programs. It strains the statute to talk about Plaintiff's 'eligibility' to be arrested . . . or to 'participate' in being arrested . . . ."). 72 See, e.g., Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that it was not clearly established that the ADA applied to prisoners); Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 658 (granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on arrestee's ADA claims). But see Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, Civ. No. 94-12-P-H, 1994 WL 589617, at *6 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 1994) (concluding that the ADA "clearly appli [ed] " to the plaintiff's claim for police misconduct).
73 524 U.S. 206 (1998). For a detailed discussion of Yeskey and its impact on Title II cases, see infra text accompanying notes 91-98. 74 925 F. Supp. at 654. The circuit court opinion provides additional detail as to the facts surrounding the incident. Gorman became involved in a disagreement at a Kansas City bar called "Guitars and Cadillacs." Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1998). Gorman started to descend the steps to the dance floor, and a bar employee told him that he could not go onto the dance floor. Id. When Gorman protested, the employee threw him out of the bar, and the employees at the door denied him readmission. Id. Gorman approached two police officers to solicit their help and ended up arguing with them. Id. They arrested him for trespassing. Id.
75 Gorman, 925 F. Supp. at 654. 76 Id. 77 Id.
trip to the station, the belt broke and Gorman fell from the bench, suffering injuries to his back and shoulders.
78
In addition, the fall broke Gorman's urine bag, leaving him soaked in his own urine.
79
Gorman filed an ADA claim against the police officer who drove the van, the police chief, and the police commissioners. 80 He alleged that the police commissioners had failed 1) to provide a proper transportation vehicle for individuals suffering from his disability, 2) to modify department policies and procedures dealing with arrest and transportation of such individuals, and 3) to establish proper training for police officers on how to handle disabled arrestees. 81 Examining the language of Title II, the district court acknowledged that the Kansas City Police Department constituted a public entity and that Gorman was disabled, but rejected the claim that the plaintiff was considered a "qualified individual with a disability," 82 as required by Title II. 83 The court explained that the statute's use of the term "eligibility" in the definition of a "qualified individual" 84 prevented Title II from applying to arrestees: "It strains the statute to talk about Plaintiff's 'eligibility' to be arrested and taken to jail or to 'participate' in being arrested . . . ." 85 The court further noted that the words "'eligible' and 'participate' imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who seeks a benefit from the state," and do not apply to criminal suspects "who are being held against their will." 86 The court therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the ADA was not applicable to Gorman's case. 87 Other courts based their refusal to apply Title II to arrestees or prisoners on the language of the statute and the intent of its framers. o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .").
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000) ("The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.").
85 925 F. Supp. at 655. 86 Id. at 656 (quoting Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1347 (4th Cir. 1995)). 87 Id.
"program or activity" was "a stretch of the statutory language and of the underlying legislative intent." 88 The court noted that the plaintiff had not pointed to any language in the ADA that specifically brought arrests within its ambit. 89 Even courts that acknowledged early on that prison activities could fall under Title II were hesitant about the idea of viewing an arrest itself as a "program or activity." the decision also served to question the foundations of the arguments against the application of Title II to arrests. First addressing the argument that Yeskey was not a "qualified individual with a disability," the Court pointed out that the definition in the statute included anyone with a disability, without exceptions for prisoners or suspected criminals. 93 Further, the Court rejected the Department of Corrections' argument that the words "eligibility" and "participation" implied voluntariness on the part of the individual seeking the benefit from the government and therefore did not apply to prisoners who were being held against their will.
94
Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, argued that this assumption was wrong for two rea-88 121 F.3d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1997). 89 Id. 90 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that an educational program in a prison is considered a "program or activity" even though incarceration itself is not); Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Incarceration itself is hardly a 'program' or 'activity' to which a disabled person might wish access, but there is no doubt that an educational program is a program, and when it is provided by and in a state prison it is a program of a public entity." (internal citation omitted)).
91 524 U.S. 206 (1998). Ronald Yeskey was a prisoner who was denied admission to a prison boot camp. Id. at 208. Yeskey was recommended for placement in a Motivational Boot Camp for first-time offenders, which, if successfully completed, would have allowed him to receive early parole. Id. However, he was refused admission because of a medical history of hypertension. Id.
92 See id. at 213 ("[T]he ADA unambiguously extends to prison inmates."). 93 Id. at 210; see 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000) (defining a "qualified individual with a disability" as a person who, "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity").
94 524 U.S. at 211.
sons: first, the words did not necessarily connote voluntariness, and second, even if the words did connote voluntariness, participation in prison activities such as the boot camp was voluntary. 95 Although the second justification for the Court's argument does not apply in the arrest context, where participation is almost always involuntary, the Court's unanimous declaration that the language of Title II did not require voluntariness destroyed a significant obstacle to plaintiffs' ADA claims pertaining to arrests.
The Yeskey Court also responded to the argument, which had frequently appeared in response to both prison and arrest-related ADA claims, that the language of the ADA did not specifically mention prisoners or arrestees in its statement of findings and purpose. 96 Stating that the contention that no reference to penal institutions appeared in the ADA was "questionable" to begin with, the Court found that even if Congress did not envision that the ADA would apply to prisoners, "in the context of an unambiguous statutory text that is irrelevant." 97 The Court explained that "the fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress'" demonstrates breadth rather than ambiguity. 98 Lower courts soon followed the lead of the Yeskey Court in construing the ADA to apply to police officers' actions. In Patrice v. Murphy, the court found support in the legislative history of the ADA "for the proposition that, at least in some circumstances, an arrest may trigger the protections of the ADA." 99 The court cited a House Judiciary Committee report on the ADA:
In order to comply with the non-discrimination mandate, it is often necessary to provide training to public employees about disability. For example, persons who have epilepsy, and a variety of other disabilities, are frequently inappropriately arrested and jailed because police officers have not received proper training in the recognition of and aid [ zures. Such discriminatory treatment based on disability can be avoided by proper training.
100
In addition, another court noted that the "broad language" of the ADA and the "absence of any stated exceptions" to its reach suggested that Title II could apply to areas involving law enforcement.
101
Lower courts were also able to rely on the statutory analysis of the ADA that the Third Circuit elucidated in Yeskey, and which the Supreme Court affirmed. 102 The court in Yeskey noted that Congress had instructed that Title II be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Rehabilitation Act, 103 and the statutory definition of "program or activity" under the Rehabilitation Act "indicate [d] that the terms were intended to be all-encompassing."
104 Additionally, the court emphasized the provision of the Rehabilitation Act that stated that "program or activity" was to include "'all of the operations of . . . a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government.'" 105 The Third Circuit opinion in Yeskey also looked to the relevant Department of Justice regulations. 106 The regulations defined " [b] enefit" as including the "provision of services, financial aid or disposition (i.e., treatment, handling, decision, sentencing, confinement, or other prescription of conduct)." 107 In addition, the regulations as- not reject plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that Title II can never be applied in an arrest context. This Part will provide a brief summary of how courts have treated disabled plaintiffs' Title II actions for police misconduct post-Yeskey.
In McCray v. City of Dothan, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment in a case brought by a deaf plaintiff who claimed that police officers had failed to accommodate his disability in arresting him. 113 The court adopted the Fifth Circuit's rule that "police activity is a government program under the ADA, but only when the circumstances surrounding the activity is [sic] 'secure' and there is 'no threat to human safety.'" 114 Not finding any evidence of a threat to human safety in the case at hand, the court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate.
115
Two years after the district court ruling, and six months after review by the Eleventh Circuit of plaintiffs' non-ADA state and federal claims, 116 the parties settled for $575,000.
117
On review of a district court ruling on a claim under the ADA for injuries sustained while being transported in a police van that was not equipped with wheelchair restraints, 118 the Eighth Circuit in Gorman v. Easley upheld a jury verdict of over two million dollars. 119 The court quickly dismissed the defendants' argument that Gorman was not a "qualified individual with a disability" and also denied two challenges by the police board to the jury instructions. 120 Gorman, 257 F.3d at 750-51. The jury instructions that the police board believed erroneous included the elements that plaintiff had to prove in order for liability to lie under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act: "First, that the defendants failed to Two recent Pennsylvania district court opinions also sided with plaintiffs who brought ADA claims for police misconduct, denying defendants' motions to dismiss. In Schorr I, the court held that the scope of "services, programs, or activities" under the ADA was not limited to "commonly available and publicly shared accommodations such as parks, playgrounds, and transportation," as a lay reader might believe, but in fact includes "the most basic of these functions . . . [namely] the lawful exercise of police powers, including the appropriate use of force by government officials acting under color of law." 121 The court further held that the Fifth Circuit's rationale for rejecting ADA claims when the conduct occurred in the face of "exigent circumstances" 122 did not apply to the Schorrs' claim because the Schorrs brought their claim not against the individual police officers, but against the police commission for failing to properly train the officers:
The alleged non-compliance with the training requirements of the ADA did not occur the day that the officers shot Ryan Schorr; it occurred well before that day, when the Defendant policy makers failed to institute policies to accommodate disabled individuals such as Schorr by giving the officers the tools and resources to handle the situation peacefully. 123 The court therefore concluded that the Schorrs' ADA claim could proceed against the police commission.
124
After the district court's ruling, the parties agreed on a settlement that included a confidential monetary payment as well as an agreement by the county and the police department to adopt procedures for dealing with mentally ill people, including the use of a mental health professional as a liaiprovide plaintiff appropriate transportation that reasonably accommodated his disability after he was arrested, and [s]econd, that as a direct result of the defendants' failure, plaintiff sustained damages." Id. at 750. The district court had defined "reasonable accommodation" as "making modifications to the defendants' practices for transporting the plaintiff after he was arrested so that he would be transported in a manner that was safe and appropriate consistent with his disability." Id. 
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son.
125
The settlement also provided for police officer training in dealing with mentally ill individuals.
126
Even more recently, in Hogan v. City of Easton, a court denied defendants' motion to dismiss an ADA claim brought by a man with a mental health disorder. 127 Michael Hogan had been shot by police who were responding to Hogan's wife's 911 call to obtain help in calming him down after he experienced deterioration in his mental condition.
128 Citing Schorr I, Yeskey, and the Eighth Circuit opinion in Gorman v. Bartch, the court held that Hogan stated a valid claim under the ADA "based on the failure of the City and County to properly train its police officers for encounters with disabled persons." 129 The Hogan case is now in the discovery phase, with a trial expected in January 2006.
130
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have not been as willing to allow disabled plaintiffs' ADA claims for police misconduct to go to a jury. In Pannell v. City of Bellvue, police officers arrested John Pannell after a brief struggle that occurred when they attempted to enter his residence in response to a 911 call of domestic violence. 131 Pannell, who was unable to communicate or move quickly due to a prior stroke, had not immediately responded to the officers' demand that he drop the baseball bat he was holding and open the door for them. 132 The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the ADA claim, holding that there was "no showing that the officers intended to act as they did toward the plaintiff on the basis that he was disabled." The following year, in Anthony v. City of New York, the Second Circuit reviewed the claim of a woman with Down Syndrome who alleged that ADA violations occurred in the course of police officers' entry into her apartment, in response to a 911 call reporting a man with a knife, and the subsequent transportation of her to a mental hospital 134 The Second Circuit, like the district court in Pannell, read a discriminatory intent requirement into Title II that did not appear in the legislative history of, or case law interpreting, the ADA: "There is no evidence . . . that the seizure and hospitalization were motivated by discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Anthony has alleged no facts showing that Sergeant Mendez, who ordered Officers Collegio and Migliaro to seize Anthony, acted with discriminatory intent." 135 The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on the ADA claim. 136 Overall, disabled plaintiffs who today bring claims under Title II for police officers' actions in effecting an arrest will find a friendlier response by district and appellate courts than did plaintiffs pre-Yeskey.
Although McCray and Pannell demonstrate that not all jurisdictions abide by the traditional Title II rule for proving a claim, most courts no longer reject the very notion of bringing an action under the ADA for police misconduct. In a number of jurisdictions, such claims are allowed to go forward, and in some, large jury verdicts in the ensuing trials are upheld.
III. TITLE II VERSUS SECTION 1983: ANOTHER BITE AT THE APPLE?
Even if courts are willing to apply Title II to police actions, questions arise about the necessity and desirability of pursuing an ADA claim in such cases. Actions under Section 1983 provide the usual civil remedy for police misconduct, and most cases that include an ADA claim resulting from an arrest also contain parallel Section 1983 claims. 137 As this Part will argue, the differences between ADA claims 134 COMPLIANCE] (discussing the case law on the question of whether a plaintiff can plead a Section 1983 action for violation of Title II of the ADA). Although the substantive law that a plaintiff would need to prove in order to succeed in a Section 1983 action based on a violation of the ADA would be different than the elements necessary to prove a Section 1983 action based on a constitutional violation, the immunities and damages would be regulated by the same rules as for any other 1983 action. See infra text accompanying notes 150-69 (discussing immunity doctrines). the elements that a plaintiff must prove vary depending on the type of claim and the type of governmental activity, 143 the Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment standards apply to Section 1983 plaintiffs' claims of excessive force when the use of force constitutes a "seizure." 144 The plaintiff must therefore first show that the force exercised against her represented a seizure. 145 In addition, as Professor Michael Avery has argued, the "totality of the circumstances" doctrine that has been adopted by courts in such Fourth Amendment cases has proven "inadequate in deterring police misconduct and in providing remedies for mentally and emotionally disturbed [plaintiffs] ." 146 This test, as articulated in Graham v. Connor, provides that courts must balance the "nature and quality" of the Fourth Amendment intrusion against the "countervailing governmental interests at stake."
147
In judging the reasonableness of the police officers' use of force-which must be examined from the perspective of a "reasonable officer on the scene"-courts look to the following three factors: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." 148 In applying the "totality of the circumstances test," lower courts have given much weight 143 to the "emergency confronting the officer and the pressures that he may have experienced" and have not required that officers use the least intrusive means possible to handle such situations.
149
Even if a plaintiff is able to prove excessive force under Section 1983, she still might not succeed in her claim because the police officer could be entitled to qualified immunity. The qualified immunity defense, which is applicable to claims of excessive force, 150 provides police officers immunity from damages "unless a reasonable officer would have known that his actions would violate clearly established constitutional rights of the plaintiff."
151
As Professor James Harrington has explained, the existence of the qualified immunity defense for police officers in Section 1983 claims "serves to make the civil rights plaintiff's burden almost insurmountable." 152 The doctrine of municipal immunity also acts as an obstacle to a successful Section 1983 claim against local governments since the Supreme Court has held that there is no respondeat superior liability under the statute.
153
Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, a plaintiff can state a claim against a local governing body for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief only if she can show that the injury she suffered was the result of the government's policy or custom. 154 In addition, in a Monell claim alleging that a municipality failed to adequately train its police officers, the plaintiff must prove that "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Court held that a qualified immunity defense is available to claims of excessive force.").
151 AVERY ET AL., supra note 142, § 2:1, at 41. As the authors of the treatise note, the scope of the protection of police officers' actions under the qualified immunity defense has expanded over the past decade. Id.
152 Harrington, supra note 138, at 437-38. "As a practical matter, officials almost always secure qualified immunity, either from the trial court or the appellate tribunal. Only the most flagrant and shocking conduct will defeat qualified immunity; merely 'stupid' actions are insufficient." Id. at 438. The (1977))). An equitable remedy against state officials will often be unsuccessful in cases of police misconduct, however, because of justiciability problems. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff, who was subjected to a chokehold following a stop for a traffic violation, did not have standing to seek an injunction against the police department because it was impossible for the plaintiff to meet his burden of showing "irreparable injury"). 160 In Hainze v. Richards, in which plaintiff Kim Michael Hainze brought claims under both Section 1983 and the ADA, the Fifth Circuit held that Hainze's Section 1983 claims had properly been dismissed because he had been convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for the same set of events that were the subject of his police misconduct claim. 162 Finally, the damages available in cases brought under Section 1983 are often limited by law. Successful plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable compensatory damages, 163 which are determined by the factfinder. 164 Proof of intentional discrimination is not necessary to obtain damages in a Section 1983 suit based on a Fourth Amendment violation. 165 In addition, a plaintiff may be entitled to attorneys' fees under Section 1988 at the discretion of the district court.
166 Punitive damages are available only when "the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when [the conduct] involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of 161 Id. at 486-87 (internal citation omitted). 162 163 See AVERY ET AL., supra note 142, § 13:2, at 598 ("The plaintiff is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for the loss, harm, or injury suffered."). 164 Id. § 13:2, at 599 ("Setting the amount of compensatory damages is generally held to be within the discretion of the trier of fact . . . ."). Though the damage award "is seldom reversed on appeal," the authors of the treatise note that some courts have recently begun "to subject compensatory damage awards to greater scrutiny." Id. others," 167 and are never available in a Monell claim against a local government. 168 The substantive law that governs the elements necessary to prove a Section 1983 claim, immunities that protect the defendants, and limits on damages have made it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring successful and worthwhile claims under this statute. 169 In fact, as several commentators have noted, the Supreme Court's recent rulings have greatly restricted civil rights plaintiffs' access to the courts and have frustrated the purpose of much of the civil rights legislation enacted over the past forty years. 170 The next Part will explore the contours of decisional law for Title II claims of police misconduct and the question of whether plaintiffs might fare better under the ADA than under Section 1983.
B. ADA Claims for Police Misconduct: Avoiding the Hoops?
The initial substantive elements that a plaintiff must prove under Title II of the ADA are entirely different from the elements necessary to prove a claim under Section 1983. In a Title II claim, a plaintiff must prove
(1) that [she] is a qualified individual with a disability; 171 (2) that [she] was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some 167 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) . 168 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 438-39 (noting that, for Monell claims, "only actual damages, and not punitive damages, are available"). In addition, a plaintiff who could not prove actual damages, but could prove liability, could argue for nominal damages. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) ("[T]he law recognizes the importance to organized society that [certain] rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury . . . ."). 169 Harrington has also articulated two other major obstacles for Section 1983 plaintiffs. See Harrington, supra note 138, at 439 (noting the interlocutory appeals system that allows an official to save the expense of mounting a defense and the appellate courts' "propensity to substitute [their] own interpretation of the facts for that of a judge or jury"). public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. 172 In addition, a plaintiff must show that the police officers knew that the plaintiff was disabled.
173 Some courts have also required that the discrimination be intentional.
174
A "totality of the circumstances" analysis does not necessarily apply to ADA claims-and countervailing governmental interests do not always come into play-because ADA claims do not implicate constitutional principles. However, while courts examining claims under the wrongful arrest theory 175 are not likely to take into account countervailing governmental interests, such interests often will come into play in the context of claims under the reasonable accommodation theory.
176
In Hainze v. Richards, for example, the court balanced the plaintiff's rights under the ADA to be free from discrimination based on his disability against the interest in public safety and prevention of risks to the officers and bystanders: "To require the officers to factor in whether their actions are going to comply with the ADA, in the presence of exigent circumstances and prior to securing the safety of themselves, other officers, and any nearby civilians, would pose an unnecessary risk to innocents." ) (denying summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's ADA claim in part because plaintiff had told the police officer that he suffered a brain aneurysm that caused physical difficulties). 174 See, e.g., Dillery v. City of Sandusky, 398 F.3d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff had not established a claim under the ADA resulting from police harassment when she was on the street in her wheelchair because she had not proven intentional discrimination); see also supra text accompanying notes 131-37 (discussing cases in which courts required evidence of intentional discrimination to establish an ADA claim for police misconduct).
175 See supra Part I.A (discussing the wrongful arrest theory 179 In fact, in the few cases in which plaintiffs have pleaded both ADA and Section 1983 claims for failure to train, courts have been more receptive to the ADA action even though the substance of the failure to train argument was the same. In Jackson v. Inhabitants of Sanford, for example, the court granted summary judgment to the town on the plaintiff's failure to train claim under Section 1983 because "Jackson offer [ed] no evidence that Town of Sanford policymakers were, prior to Jackson's arrest, deliberately indifferent to inadequate training policies likely to result in constitutional violations." 180 However, on the plaintiff's ADA claim that the town "failed to train its police officers to recognize symptoms of disabilities and . . . to modify police policies, practices and procedures to prevent discriminatory treatment of the disabled," the court denied summary judgment. 181 The immunities available to defendants also differ under Title II. Since Title II claims must be brought against government entities, 182 not individual defendants, the qualified immunity defense usually does not apply. 183 As the ADA Practice and Compliance Manual notes:
178 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting a deliberate indifference requirement). 179 However, it must be noted that even if a failure to train claim might be easier to prove under Title II than under Section 1983, a plaintiff may still have to prove intentional discrimination in order to receive compensatory damages. See infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the standard for obtaining compensatory damages under Title II). . 182 Title II provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall be "excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (emphasis added).
183 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 442 (noting that "issues of qualified (good faith) immunity and municipal immunity do not arise" in ADA actions against government entities). "The defense of qualified immunity is available to defendants only when they are sued in their individual capacities . . . ." PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, § 7:75. Despite the seemingly clear language of Title II, there is some confusion among the courts as to whether ADA claims may be brought against defendants in their individual capacity, and whether qualified immunity may apply. Most courts recognize that the provisions of the ADA allow only for claims against government entities. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[I]ndividuals who do not independently meet the ADA's definition of Whether qualified immunity is available at all in suits brought pursuant to ADA Title II is an open question since the defense is available only in individual capacity suits, but the recent trend is for courts to hold that individual capacity suits are not cognizable under Title II, which is directed at public entities. 184 Similarly, municipal immunity is not an issue because the ADA claim itself is brought against a government entity, and therefore a Monell theory of respondeat superior is unnecessary. 185 The question of sovereign immunity in Title II actions, however, is more complex. 186 The Supreme Court has held that "Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and 'act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.'" 187 Because it is settled law that the language of the ADA evidences Congress's intent to abrogate the states' immunity, 188 the relevant question is whether Congress passed the ADA pursuant to a "valid grant of constitutional authority." The Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immu- George Lane and Beverly Jones, the respondents in the case, were paraplegics who used wheelchairs and claimed that they were denied access to the state courts. 195 The Court's holding was limited by the nature of the respondents' claim: " [W] 197 The Lane Court's analysis of whether Congress had the power under Section Five to enact Title II of the ADA relied heavily on the basic constitutional guarantees that Congress sought to remedy under the Act. Id. at 522-23. These guarantees were "subject to more searching judicial review" than discrimination based on a disability, which is subject only to rational basis review. Id. The Court referred to the right of access to courts, which was specifically at issue in Lane, as a right that is "protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 523. The rights claimed by disabled plaintiffs seeking to sue state governments for harm caused during an arrest similarly implicate the Due Process Clause. In addition, the Lane Court's discussion of the harm that Title II was designed to address cited a "pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting." Id. at 525 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 198 The Court has, however, granted certiorari in a case pertaining to a closelyrelated question: whether states are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suits by disabled prisoners under the ADA. Further, the reasons for the Heck bar-to prevent plaintiffs from bringing Section 1983 claims as a backdoor way of challenging their convictions-would not serve the intended purpose in many Title II claims pertaining to police misconduct, particularly those brought under the reasonable accommodation theory. In such a case, a plaintiff would be arguing that the defendants had failed to properly train the arresting officers to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability. Logically, therefore, the plaintiff's argument would not necessarily call into question the appropriateness of his arrest or sentence.
205
Compensatory damages may be available under Title II of the ADA, but intentional discrimination must be shown.
206 Punitive damages may not be awarded. 207 In Barnes v. Gorman, the Supreme Court determined that just as punitive damages could not be obtained in suits under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they also could not be obtained in claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because the ADA incorporates the "remedies, procedures, and rights" of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Rehabilitation Act in turn incorporates the "remedies, procedures, and rights" with disabilities has discussed the ADA's predecessor, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, in only a cursory fashion, if at all." 213 Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity." 214 In regard to claims of police misconduct, Title II is "similar in substance to the Rehabilitation Act, and cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable." 215 In addition, the ADA provides that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" of the Rehabilitation Act "shall be the remedies procedures, and rights" provided to plaintiffs under the ADA. 216 The substantial similarity and interrelatedness between Section 504 and Title II suggests that the elements, potential defenses, and damages available for a claim under Section 504 would parallel the elements, potential defenses, and damages available under Title II, 217 and that courts willing to apply Title II to claims of police misconduct 218 would similarly be willing to apply Section 504 to those claims. Indeed, some courts examining actions in which plaintiffs have pleaded claims under both Section 504 and Title II have not distinguished between the two claims in their opinions. 219 The one major difference between Title II and Section 504-the federal funding requirement attached to Section 504-has two important implications for claims of police misconduct, one that constricts 213 the potential scope of Rehabilitation Act actions and one that expands it. Only public entities that receive federal funding may be sued under Section 504. However, as Eyer has pointed out, while this limitation is a substantial one for plaintiffs who sue private actors, it has only a minor effect in the area of "state-perpetrated discrimination," because (1) if a state entity receives any of its funding from the federal government, it is subject to liability under Section 504 for all of its programs or activities; 220 and (2) "a very substantial proportion of state budget dollars are allocated to state entities that are also recipients of federal funding." 221 In fact, in recent years very few actions against state actors under the Rehabilitation Act have been dismissed because the defendant did not receive federal funds. 222 Therefore, while the limitation created by the federal funding requirement of the Rehabilitation Act does not appear to create a major obstacle for plaintiffs claiming police misconduct, the advantages that the funding requirement provides have the potential to set it apart significantly from Title II. States are not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from federal suits under Section 504 because when Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1986 223 it "unambiguously condition[ed] the receipt of federal funds on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to claims under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act," 224 and state agencies waive their immunity by "continuing to accept federal funds." 225 Therefore, if plaintiffs are unable to successfully sue state government entities under Title II because of the state's sovereign immunity, a parallel claim under Section 504 would succeed where the ADA claim failed.
D. Pleading Complementary Claims
As the analysis of the case law surrounding Section 1983, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims suggests, plaintiffs bringing any of these actions face a number of obstacles and limitations. A Section 1983 plaintiff may have difficulty proving a Fourth Amendment violation given the "totality of the circumstances" test, may not be able to make a Monell showing necessary to establish the police department's municipal liability, or may lose on the basis of a Heck bar against recovery. A Title II plaintiff may fail to prove her claim because she is unable to prove that she has a disability under the ADA, as defined by the courts; or she may succeed in proving her claim, but then find that she is entitled only to nominal damages because she has not proven intent to discriminate. A Section 504 plaintiff may find her claim dismissed because the state governmental entity that she is suing does not receive federal funds.
Although, as Part III.B suggests, there are benefits to pleading a police misconduct claim under the ADA, 226 there are also areas in which a plaintiff would fare better under Section 1983 than under Title II. Under the ADA, plaintiffs cannot receive punitive damages and must show intentional discrimination to receive even compensatory damages. 227 A Section 1983 claim predicated on the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, allows for reasonable compensatory damages without a showing of intentional discrimination, 228 and for punitive damages where a plaintiff can show either defendants' malicious intent or callous indifference to federally protected rights 229 -a showing that might not be much more difficult than the showing of intentional discrimination necessary to recover compensatory damages under the ADA.
230
226 See supra Part III.B (describing how an ADA claim differs from a Section 1983 claim-in terms of elements, immunities, and the Heck bar-in ways that may make it easier for a plaintiff to succeed with an ADA claim). 227 See supra text accompanying notes 206-08 (discussing damages available under Title II). 228 See supra note 165 (stating that claims under Section 1983 generally do not require a showing of intent). 229 See supra text accompanying notes 167-69 (discussing the standard for obtaining punitive damages under Section 1983). 230 See supra text accompanying note 206 (noting the standard for obtaining compensatory damages under the ADA). In the case of a failure to train claim against a municipality, there is an additional requirement under Section 1983 that complicates the issue of damages: the plaintiff must prove that the failure to train constitutes a policy or custom that amounts to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). For compensatory damages, therefore, the damages analysis for a failure to train claim depends on whether it is more difficult for a plaintiff to prove deliberate indifference under Section 1983 or intentional discrimination under Title II. In fact, some courts have conflated the two standards, reading the deliberate indifference re-Because of the complementary nature of Section 1983, Title II, and Section 504, it would be beneficial for a disabled plaintiff to plead all three claims in an action for police misconduct. 231 Therefore, James Harrington's recommendation that plaintiffs use creative lawyering in bringing civil rights claims, 232 and Stephen Gold's suggestion that plaintiffs use Rehabilitation Act claims to "piggy-back" on Title II claims, 233 appear to be wise advice. Harrington writes that plaintiffs should "first plead the ADA Title II action against the government entity involved," and then "plead a § 1983 action, carefully and in great factual detail, against an individual and municipality to attempt to overcome potential immunity issues." 234 Because the case law on ADA and Rehabilitation Act immunities is far less developed than the Section 1983 case law, pleading a Title II claim also provides a plaintiff with greater potential to convince the court that the substantive law in the area-as well as the law on immunities and damages-falls in her favor. Cir. 1997) , that a "policy of discrimination" does not need to be identified by a Title II plaintiff in order to bring a successful claim for compensatory damages). 231 There is no procedural bar to pleading all three of these claims together. Although some courts have rejected claims under Section 1983 based on a violation of the ADA under the theory that the ADA is the exclusive remedy for such violations, see PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 142, § 2:51 (discussing courts' rejection of Section 1983 actions for violations of Title II), this theory does not defeat Section 1983 claims for constitutional violations that are based on the same facts as parallel ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. See id. ("The inability to enforce the ADA under § 1983 does not preclude a § 1983 suit for due process violations arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts.").
232 See Harrington, supra note 138, at 463-64 (advocating "creativity of counsel" in using the ADA to "fill the void left by § 1983 decisional law"). 233 Telephone Interview with Stephen Gold, Esq., supra note 212 (advocating the use of Rehabilitation Act claims in conjunction with ADA claims). 234 Harrington, supra note 138, at 464. 235 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
because Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in such cases. However, a plaintiff would be unable to argue that states can be sued for monetary damages under Section 1983, since case law in that area is settled.
E. Going Beyond Section 1983: Responding to Particularized Discrimination
In addition to the benefits that a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act creates in terms of the decisional law on immunities and damages, such a claim also provides disabled plaintiffs with a unique advantage: in terms of the substance of the pleadings, the governing law, and the possible remedy, the claim will be framed to respond to the particularized discrimination in question-discrimination based on disability.
Claims that police departments and local governments have failed to appropriately train officers are prime examples of the importance of particularized ADA claims. Plaintiffs suing under the ADA can argue not only that the policymaking defendants failed to train officers in the appropriate use of force and in avoiding discriminatory behavior, but specifically that the defendants failed to train their officers in how to treat people with disabilities and how to respond to situations involving disabled citizens so as to prevent situations from escalating and resulting in injury or death.
In Hogan v. City of Easton, for example, plaintiff Michael Hogan's ADA claim alleged that the city and the county failed to properly train their police officers for "peaceful encounters with disabled persons," and that such failure resulted in discrimination against him. 237 In his complaint, Hogan asserted that (1) upon the police officers' arrival at his residence in response to a 911 call from his wife, his family members advised the police that Hogan suffered from anxiety, panic disorders, and depression, and that he should be approached in a calm and quiet manner; (2) the officers refused to use peaceful mechanisms to resolve the standoff that developed and "instead isolated Mr. Hogan from his private sources of aid;" (3) the officers further escalated the situation by activating the city's SWAT team; and (4) as a result of the police officers' action, Hogan felt "trapped and severely the district judge in the summary judgment ruling. 245 The town had to ensure that police officers received adequate training in distinguishing between symptoms of disabilities and criminal activity, and had to ensure that its policies and procedures did not discriminate against people with disabilities.
246
Although the law pertaining to failure to train claims under the ADA is fairly undeveloped, courts in cases such as Jackson have been receptive to such claims.
247 As these cases demonstrate, failure to train claims epitomize the advantages of pleading actions under the ADA: first by helping a disabled plaintiff to prove the claim, and then by enabling her to procure an appropriate remedy. By molding a claim to fit the particularized rights violation, a plaintiff may increase the likelihood that she will succeed in her claim and receive a remedy that responds most appropriately to the violation. 248 Pleading a claim to fit the rights violation in question more closely also brings important additional benefits. By pushing courts to develop more detailed standards for determining questions of law pertaining to the interaction between disabled persons and law enforcement officials, plaintiffs will encourage the creation of a body of disability-rights law that courts may apply even in non-ADA contexts. In addition, more frequent ADA claims for police misconduct may bring about modifications to policies and practices, which will help focus and strengthen the standards for such policies and practices in the context of Section 1983 claims.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that for police misconduct cases, there is a strategic incentive for a disabled plaintiff to bring claims under the ADA in addition to the traditional claims under Section 1983. Part II described how courts since Yeskey have generally been willing to allow plaintiffs to plead Title II claims related to law enforcement activities. The assumptions that had previously resulted in frequent 245 Id. 246 Id. 247 See supra text accompanying notes 178-82 (discussing courts' treatment of failure to train claims under the ADA). 248 See supra text accompanying notes 237-47 (citing Hogan and Jackson as examples of how pleading an ADA claim, rather than a Section 1983 claim, can benefit a plaintiff both by increasing her likelihood of success and by paving the way for a remedy that responds to the specific violation because ADA actions focus on the defendants' specific conduct that discriminated based on disability). dismissal of such claims-that ADA's language and intent precluded prisoners or arrestees from falling under Title II's prohibition on denial of the "benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity" 249 -were discarded by the Supreme Court in Yeskey and no longer serve as justification for a blanket rule excluding such plaintiffs from the reach of Title II. 250 The difficulties inherent in Section 1983 actions for police misconduct, explored in Part III, heighten the necessity for disabled plaintiffs to plead parallel Title II and Section 504 claims. Although the road is certainly not free of comparable obstacles for such claims, and the monetary damages that are available under Title II may be limited, such actions complement Section 1983 actions by requiring different elements and generally falling subject to fewer claims of immunity by defendants.
However, beyond the practical and strategic justifications for pleading parallel ADA claims in police misconduct cases, as Part III.E suggested, lies a more compelling reason for disabled plaintiffs to include such claims. The ADA was intended to provide a mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities, 251 but it is not entirely self-implementing legislation. Even though Title II directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to ensure that public entities do not discriminate against people with disabilities, 252 many forms of discrimination against the disabled go unnoticed and unchanged. As Susan Stefan has written of discrimination based on disability, "[t]he more deeply structural, embedded, and nondiscrete the discrimination is, the less it is recognizable or remediable as discrimination." goes unrecognized. An officer who is taught to use force when confronted with what she perceives as a threat may apply that knowledge when responding to a mentally or physically disabled person, not realizing that by treating this person the same way that she treats others, she may in fact be failing to reasonably accommodate his disability, and thereby discriminate against him.
254
Section 1983 actions, whether or not they result in a successful judgment for a plaintiff, will not by themselves send a sufficient message to police departments and state and local governments that they must change their practices to accommodate people with disabilities and provide training for their officers in how to respond to the needs of the disabled. Actions under the ADA will send precisely such a message.
